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In post-Napoleonic Europe, where the Holy Alliance was dominant, the dogma of the 
legitimacy of sovereign governments ensured the status quo. The question about the legitimacy 
of the Greek Revolution, which broke out in March 1821, was put forward for discussion at the 
Congress of Laibach (January - May 1821). There, the monarchies agreed that the Greek 
Revolution was illegal, and their penmen condemned it as an offspring of the French 
Revolution, the 'monster' that had declared an all-out war against all legitimacy, supporting at 
the same time the Sultan as the legitimate sovereign of the Greeks. The issue, however, did not 
end there. The debate about the legitimacy of the Greek War of Independence continued with 
recriminations among its supporters and its opponents, while the Greek revolutionaries pursued 
the legitimation of the Revolution having on their side as an ally the mass philhellenic 
movement which demonstrated its support. The aim of this study is to present the arguments 
about this issue, the political positions and the stakes of each side, as these were formulated in 
contemporary foreign and Greek texts: documents, pamphlets, correspondence, the press. 
 









En la Europa post napoleónica, cuando dominaba la Santa Alianza, el dogma de la legitimidad 
de los gobiernos soberanos aseguraba el statu quo. La cuestión acerca de la legitimidad de la 
Revolución Griega, que estalló en marzo de 1821, fue presentada para su discusión en el 
Congreso de Laibach (enero-mayo 1821). Allí, las monarquías acordaron que la Revolución 
Griega era ilegal, y sus publicistas la condenaron como descendiente de la Revolución Francesa, 
el "monstruo" que había declarado una guerra total contra toda legitimidad, mientras apoyaban 
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al Sultán como soberano legítimo de los griegos. La cuestión, sin embargo, no terminó allí. El 
debate sobre la legitimidad de la Guerra de Independencia de Grecia continuó con 
recriminaciones entre sus partidarios y sus oponentes, mientras los revolucionarios griegos 
procuraban la legitimación de la revolución que tiene de su lado como un aliado al movimiento 
de masas filohelénico, que les daba su apoyo. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar los 
argumentos acerca de este problema, las posiciones políticas y las apuestas de cada lado, 
formulados en textos contemporáneos extranjeros y griegos: documentos, panfletos, 
correspondencia y prensa. 
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The principle of the legitimacy of absolute monarchies was proposed in 
September 1814 at the Congress of Vienna as a guideline in Europe after the fall of 
Napoleon, who, as a non-absolute monarch, was perceived as a threat to the Restoration 
and the Holy Alliance. Metternich of Austria distributed Europe in accordance with the 
existing thrones, without taking into account the peoples’ nationality. The principle of 
hereditary legitimacy as an outcome of the divine will restored the omnipotence of the 
monarchs, who ought not only to maintain order and peace but also to leave the existing 





In such unfavorable political circumstances in Europe, but also during the so-
called “era of revolutions” (Hobsbawm, 1962; Palmer, 1959-1964; Armitage & 
Subrahmanyam, 2010), the Greek War of Independence broke out in 1821.
2
 The war 
started initially in Moldavia (February 1821), where the Greek community flourished 
and the collaboration of the native population led by Tudor Vladimirescu had been 
secured. The war was led by the Greek prince Alexandros Ypsilantis, an army officer in 
the service of the Tsar of Russia Alexander I, after a long period of preparation 
undertaken by the Filiki Etairia, which operated according to the model of masonic 
lodges and secret societies. The demands of the Greek revolutionaries, as is obvious in 
Ypsilantis’s proclamation, were the Christian faith and the freedom of the nation, values 
associated, on the one hand, with the liberal European milieu, whose collaboration was 
eagerly expected (“many of these liberals want to join in order to fight together with us 
(…) you want to see those old colossi of despotism fall”), and on the other hand, with 
the ancestors: “So, let us invite freedom anew, oh brave and magnanimous Greeks, back 
to the classical land of Greece!” (Kremmydas, 1991: 67-82). 
The revolutionaries insinuated that a great power would contribute to the war, 
namely, Russia, which shared the same religion. As a member of the Holy Alliance, 
Russia was not willing to cooperate, something made clear by the Greek Count Ioannis 
                                                 
1
 See also Sellin (2011). 
2
 See, among others, Gordon (1832), Finlay (2014, reprint of the edition of 1861), Woodhouse (1952), 
Dakin (1973). 
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Kapodistrias, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tsar, in his letter to Ypsilantis, where 
Filiki Etairia is denounced as a secret society whose aim is to undermine the 
authoritarian regimes. However, the same text acknowledges the existence of a Greek 
nation that aspires to its renaissance and liberation, which, however, should not be 
pursued “via rebellion and civil war”; therefore, the revolt in Moldavia did not justify a 
break with their ally, the Ottoman Empire (Philimon,
 
1859). Kapodistrias participated, 
as a representative of the tsar, in the Congress of Laibach (26 January – 12 May 1821), 
where the sovereigns and the representatives of the great powers met in order to 
examine the international situation and to deal with the revolutions that had broken out 
in Spain, Italy and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the decision of mainly Austrian politics that 
every revolutionary movement should be eradicated by the Holy Alliance was not 
countersigned by France and England, something which already threatened the 
allegedly seamless unity of the Holy Alliance (Driault, 1925: 129 ff.). 
The Russian disapproval became known around the end of March, when Philiki 
Etairia started to take action. The Revolution was also condemned by the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople following the order of the Sublime Porte, and the revolutionaries were 
excommunicated by the patriarch Gregory V on 23
rd
 March, when Ypsilantis and his 
followers reportedly invented “the satanic project of arousing the people”, which is 
opposed to the submission owed to the God-sent Ottoman Empire. Despite this 
condemnation, the Revolution broke out in southern Greece too. The manifesto of the 
Messinian Senate to the European courts (25
th
 March) declares that the revolutionaries 
took up arms in order to defend their rights, and that they ask for the contribution of 
Europe, which ought to reflect on its debt to ancient Greece (Philimon,
 
1860).  
The decision of the Holy Alliance and the condemnation of the Greek Revolution 
constituted an issue of recriminations in the press and in various pamphlets that were in 
circulation. In France, the view of conservative circles is expressed by the ultra 
(royalist) Comte de Salaberry in his essay (June 1821), in which he gloats over the 
decision of European leaders to condemn the revolutions that threaten the royal thrones. 
Salaberry, after enumerating the contemporary liberal revolutions in Europe, including 
Ypsilantis’s Revolution, characterizes them as offspring of the French Revolution, the 
“monster” that had declared all-out war against every legitimacy (Comte de Salaberry, 
1821: 1, 2). Next, he stresses that the value of legitimacy is universally acknowledged 
and that Europe ought to enforce respect for it for the sake of Europe (Comte de 
Salaberry, 1821: 28). Focusing on the Revolution of the Danubian Principalities, he 
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believes that the Ottomans have legal sovereignty in Wallachia and Moldavia from the 
moment that those peoples recognized the Ottomans as conquerors according to treaties 
in compliance with the public law. Respect for the value of legitimacy must be 
implemented in the case of the Ottoman Empire too, in the same way in which it is 
applicable to all European kingdoms. Even more so in the case of the Ottomans, who 
granted to the peoples of the Principalities, who were subject to tax, the right to practice 
their religion free and to elect their leaders. The privilege to be self-governed was lost, 
Salaberry points out, after their uprisings, when the Sublime Porte, from the beginning 
of the 18
th
 century onwards, appoints Greek leaders from Constantinople (the 
Phanoriotes), who are their real oppressors (Comte de Salaberry, 1821: 3-11). 
The condemning discourse about the illegitimacy of the Greek War of 
Independence had also its opposite side. To begin with, the conservative Greeks in the 
Tsar’s court attempted to differentiate the Greek Revolution from the Italian ones by 
emphasizing, first, the religious character of the war between Christians and Muslims, 
and, second, the fact that the Sultan was not the legitimate sovereign of the Greeks. 
Alexander Strourtza published his views in a pamphlet of 1823, where he maintains that 
the uprisings are legal only when the authority is abusive and illegitimate rather than 
paternal. The Ottoman rule is such an illegitimate authority not because it has conquered 
other peoples but because it does not recognize any right to the conquered, thereby 
leading them either to riot or to enslavement (Strourtza: 1823: 17-19).
3
 
From September 1821 onwards, the question of the legitimacy of the Greek war 
became the topic of a systematic dispute between the French publicists Henri de Bonald 
and Achille de Jouffroy, in the columns of the monarchic newspapers Journal des 
Débats και Gazette de France respectively. The moderate monarchist Bonald supports 
the legality of the Greek war of liberation against the Turks, who are not legitimate 
sovereigns but conquerors manu military that have “camped” in Europe. The Greeks, 
although conquered, maintained their language, their religion and their customs. Thus, 
the military occupation of the country does not entail legitimacy, for the latter 
presupposes peace, freedom and equality of rights among the peoples, something which 
is not the case in the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan is the legal sovereign of the Turks 
alone, who are his real subjects, although the Turks ignore the concepts of legitimacy 
and reason. Bonald differentiates between état légal, which has laws as every human 
                                                 
3
 La Grèce en 1821 et 1822. Correspondance politique publiée par un Grec. See also Ghervas (2008: 
221, 370-375).  
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community does, and société legitime, which is distinguished thanks to its civilization 
and Christianity, as is the case in European societies.
4
 
The ultra Jouffroy, after pointing out in his reply that the ideas of Bonald were 
applauded by the liberals, contends that the principle of legitimacy must be applicable 
in every society, provided that it is based on the public law, politics and international 
relations. Supporting a specific revolution as legitimate jeopardizes the established 
legitimacy and may lead to the danger of anarchy. The Ottoman government is as 
legitimate as every other, it has been recognized by the governments of Europe and has 
historical rights over the Greeks, who recognized the Sultan as their legitimate 
sovereign after their conquest. 
The geographer Conrand Malte-Brun, an ex-liberal who joined the monarchists, 
intervenes in the dispute, publishing two articles in the newspaper Journal des Débats, 
where he suggests that the term légitimités nationales that he used in his book Tableau 
de l’Europe (Paris 1821) does not contradict the principles of monarchy insofar as it 
includes religion, state independence, territorial integrity, individual and collective 
property and all rights. The principle of legitimacy could be applied to the Greek case 
too, something which should satisfy the friends of monarchy, who would see European 
legitimacy stabilize and be extended to all the countries directly related to Europe, in 
particular because of religion. In Greece, although the Patriarchate declared obedience 
to Muhammad II after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, the situation is illegal because 
the granted privileges are not valid any longer and the Greeks do not have rights. Thus, 
the Sultan is not their legitimate sovereign, and this is what ought to be emphasized if 
one wishes to help the Greeks rather than support their war in the name of revolutionary 
freedom and equality, which is what the liberals do, who hate the European 
governments. In any case, the armed intervention of the foreign powers is not justified.
5
 
When Greeks were informed about the condemnation of their revolution, they 
attempted to defend their fight which was still in progress in southern Greece after the 
defeat of Ypsilantis in the Danubian Principalities, and they promoted the view of the 
conservative French Philhellenes
6
 about the illegitimacy of the Ottoman regime as 
opposed to the legitimate Greek Revolution. Konstantinos Polychroniadis, in the 
                                                 
4
 What we see here is obviously the compromise between hereditary monarchy and the liberal form of 
legitimacy, which is the polity of constitutional monarchy supported by Benjamin Constant (De l’esprit 
de conquête et de l’usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne, 1814). See 
Würtenberger (1982: 703-704). 
5
 For this dispute, see Dimakis (1968: 188-213). 
6
 For the conservative religious French Philhellenes, see Tabaki-Iona (2005: 47-60).  
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autumn of 1821, published in Paris a pamphlet where he supports that the Turks were 
associated with the European public law through agreements rather than treaties. The 
Greek subjects are regarded as prisoners of war, not citizens, and the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman regime should not be equated with that of the European ones, as suggested by 
certain people who in this way approve of every conquest while undermining the 
struggles of Christian leaders to expel the Turks from Europe. What made the Greek 
Revolution worthwhile and rendered it legitimate was the fact that the whole nation 
rebelled not against a government demanding more liberties, as was the case with the 
Carbonari with whom the Greek revolutionaries were identified, but against their 
barbaric conquerors in order to defend the freedom of their faith and their national 
independence, but also in order to become one of the civilized nations of Europe 
(Polychroniadis, 1821: 27, 31).
7
 
The protagonists of the Revolution, such as Alexandros Mavrokordatos, president 
of the temporary government, who has been associated in the past with the English 
liberals and with Shelley in particular, adopt a stance that seeks to avoid confrontation 
with the contemporary European politics of the Holy Alliance, and that promotes the 
view of the conservative philhellenes and differentiates the Greek Revolution from 
other revolutions in Europe, especially the Italian ones. They were informed about this 
view by the press and the published pamphlets, and they were sometimes in contact 
with philhellenes such as Lord Thomas Erskine, who puts forward this view in a 
pamphlet of 1822
8
, and reiterates it in his letter to Mavrokordatos in 1823:  
“The Greeks should not be compared by the nations of Europe 
with the colonies which they founded and which in these days 
rioted against their metropolises and became autonomous; when 
and under which circumstances these significant changes took 
place, whether they are blameworthy or not, all these issues have 
nothing to do with your old nation, when it promotes its original 
independence – neither the riots in Neapolis nor the discontent of 
European Administrations bear any relation to the war in Greece. 
The Greeks were not colonists, nor subjects of the Ottoman 
Porte, nor can I regard the Turkish tyranny as an authority which 
the defeated nations, in the common history of the world, wanted 
to acknowledge or wished to be governed by, after submitting to 
it according to the laws and customs of the enlightened states; on 
                                                 
7
 Considérations sur la guerre actuelle entre les Grecs et les Turcs, par un Grec. 
8
 A Letter to the Earl of Liverpool, on the Subject of the Greeks. By Thomas Lord Erskine. 
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the contrary, I regard the Turkish oppression and tyranny as a 
terrifying and secret project of the divine providence”.9 
 
The gap that the Greeks and the conservative philhellenes wish to establish 
between the Greek Revolution and those in Europe and America results in the 
affirmation of a certain distance between themselves, on the one hand, and the Filiki 
Etairia and the revolution in the Danubian Principalities, on the other; the latter 
revolution had been designated as a subversive one. One can see the distinction between 
the two revolutions, that in Moldavia and that in Greece, in the pamphlets of the 
conservative scholar Panagiotis Kodrikas, who lives in Paris as an employee of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kodrikas, who frequently refers to Bonald, 
designates the revolution of Moldavia by using the French word révolution, uses the 
term insurrection for the legitimate revolution of the nation, whereas he designates the 
uprising against a legitimate monarch a rebellion (Kodrikas, 1822: 21).
10
 
Although the monarchists are the most powerful in Europe, the voices of the 
liberals who support the Greek Revolution without exception can also be heard. This is 
the case with the ex-advisor of Napoleon, the abbot Dominique Dufour de Pradt, who is 
mentioned by Polychroniadis (March 1822). Pradt believes that Greece, where 
civilization makes progress in contrast with Turkey, revolted against the Ottoman 
empire encouraged by the wind of freedom and the revolutions that broke out across the 
world. In other words, he identifies the Greek Revolution with the other revolutions in 
Europe and America, which are democratic and dangerous for the monarchies of Europe 
(Pradt: 1822: 91, 108-110).
11
 
The Congress of Verona, held in autumn 1822 so that the revolutions in Spain, 
Italy and Greece could be discussed, did not agree to meet the representatives of Greece 
so as not to give the impression that it legitimates the Revolution, and went on to 
condemn the Revolution, although it ruled out the option of immediate intervention due 
to Kapodistrias’s intercession with the Tsar. The result of the condemnation was that the 
Greek leaders avoid being involved in political groups, as they attempt to be on good 
terms with monarchic Europe but also with the Philhellenes of diverse political shades. 
The primary goal of the Revolution is national independence and not “the 
                                                 
9
 Μνημεία της Ελληνικής Ιστορίας [Monuments of Greek History], vol. 5, Ιστορικόν Αρχείον Αλεξάνδρου 
Μαυροκορδάτου [Historical Archive of Alexandros Mavrokordatos], ΙΙΙ, documents from 1823, published 
by Emmanuel G. Protopsaltis (1968: 456-459).  
10
 Remarques politiques sur la cause des Grecs. 
11
 De la Grèce dans ses rapports avec l’Europe, par M. de Pradt. 
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transformation of the regime, whichever that may be”, clarifies Mavrokordatos (April 
1822) (Protopsaltis, 1961: 133)
12
, while Polychroniadis seems to agree on the election 
of the monarch, something which “may please the oligarchs of Europe and decrease 
their aversion to us” (Protopsaltis, 1961: 133). Nevertheless, during the war, the Greek 
government, with a view to honoring the ancestors, makes use of ancient names of the 
Greek democracy to designate its institutions, and the Greek constitutions were 
formulated having as their model the constitutions of the French Revolution (Tsourka-
Papastathi, 1989: 341-348). 
The Greeks can now count on the support of the Philhellenes
13
 alone, who take 
action in favour of the Greek war by founding committees, by participating in war 
events (sometimes even by giving their lives as is the case with Lord Byron) and by 
publishing philhellenic texts in many languages (Droulia, 1974). Most of those texts 
were written in French, reflect on the causes behind the Greek Revolution and present 
the historical rights of the Greek case. Their rhetoric is based on reiterated arguments, 
stereotypes and motifs that circulated throughout Europe (Sfoini, 2013/2015). The 
discourse against the Muslims is associated with the question of the legitimacy of the 
sovereign, which is one of the major topics in the pamphlets. 
Already in July 1821, the Appel aux Grecs by the Greek scholar Adamantios 
Korais who lived in Paris, had been translated into French together with the 
proclamation by Ypsilantis. The royalist translator baron Guerrier de Dumast underlines 
in his introduction that, firstly, the idea of legitimacy “never crossed a Turkish mind”, 
and that it is thanks to the Holy Alliance that “the great Turk became legitimate”, and 
secondly, that in the Greek case there was not a divergence between different classes 
within a nation; in other words, there was not a revolution but a solid resistance of the 
whole nation against the foreigners, and finally, in contrast with other revolutions, 
religion and freedom here, “those two sacred names are united” (Korais, 1821: 10-13).14 
The liberal Jules David believes that in the land of freedom there is no place for slavery, 
insofar as the latter does not constitute a right or a legitimate state of political affairs. He 
also distinguishes liberté civile from indépendance nationale without which no liberty 
                                                 
12
 Ιγνάτιος μητροπολίτης Ουγγροβλαχίας (1766-1828), ΙΙ. Αλληλογραφία, πολιτικά υπομνήματα, λόγοι, 
σημειώματα περί Ιγνατίου, [Metropolitan Ignatius of Hungary-Wallachia (1766-1828), II. 
Correspondence, political speeches, remarks on Ignatius], Μνημεία της Ελληνικής Ιστορίας, [Monuments 
of Greek History], D, ΙΙ.   
13
 For the trend of Philhellenism, see, among others, Clair (1972), Athanassoglou-Kallmyer (1989), 
Roessel (2002), Montadon (2008), Barau (2009). 
14
 Σάλπισμα πολεμιστήριον. Appel aux Grecs. Traduit du grec modern d’Atromète, natif de Marathon; 
avec la Proclamation d’Ypsilanti aux Français. 
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can exist (David, 1821: 9).
15
 The German professor of philosophy in Leipzig Wilhelm 
Traugott Krug, one of the first Philhellenes (Quack-Eustathiades, 1984: 21 ff.), suggests 
that the power of the Turks that made Europe tremble belongs now to the past. The 
Sultans do not undertake military campaigns any longer but spend their days in the 
harem; their sovereignty is not legitimate, it is usurpation. What kind of legitimacy can 
the Sultan have who is the illegitimate offspring of illegitimate ancestors?
16
 The liberal 
Benjamin Constant, while criticizing monarchy, wonders what kind of legality can the 
Ottoman despotism have when succession is based on patricide, fratricide, the riots of 
soldiers and the revolts of the mob (Constant: 1825: 15).
17
 The ex Feuillant and now 
defender of the monarchy Charles Lacretelle, in his speech presented to the Société 
Royale des Bonnes Lettres, expressed a similar concern, touching on the question of the 
legitimacy of Asian despotism (Lacretelle, 1825: 4-6).
18
 
Some Philhellenes went as far as to propose a new Crusade of Christian kings 
against the Sultan, which crusade would liberate the Greeks and would differentiate 
itself from the old Crusade and its aspirations of conquest (Viennet, 1821: 3, 10, 23).
19
 
Malte-Brun is a supporter of the new Crusade too. In his essay, legitimacy is defined as 
the “continuous and inviolable transfer of specific properties, of certain rights which 
pre-exist the laws, which the social forces cannot abolish but to which they should, on 
the contrary, be adapted” (Malte-Brun, 1824: 12).20 In the case of enslaved peoples, 
there is one sovereign ruler, whereas in the case of free nations, the natural legitimacy 
belongs to the nation itself that elects its own government. Greece was not a recognized 
nation so it could not ask for the help of the Christian kings who had signed treaties 
with the Ottomans. Greece was an enslaved nation that never legally integrated into the 
society of conquest; its people had no human rights and they were not a rebellious 
people (Malte-Brun, 1824: 276 ff.). 
The Romantic writer Réné de Chateaubriand, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
conservative government Villèle, having significant influence on monarchist circles, 
undergoes a political conversion after being removed from his post. In his appeal in 
                                                 
15
 Appel aux nations en faveur des Grecs, par un citoyen français. 
16
 Letztes Wort über die griechische Sache von Wilhelm Traugott Krug der Philosophie Professor in 
Leipzig (Frankfurt – Leipzig, p. 14 ff.). 
17
 Appel aux nations chrétiens en faveur des Grecs, rédigé par M. Benjamin Constant, et adopté par le 
comité des Grecs de la Société de la Morale Chrétienne.  
18
 Considérations  sur la cause des Grecs, par M. Ch. Lacretelle, de l’Académie française.  
19
 Épitre aux Rois de la Chretienté, sur l’indépendance de la Grèce, suivie de l’Épitre à Morellet, sur la 
philosophie du 18e siècle, par J.-P.-C. Viennet. 
20
 Traité de la légitimité considérée comme base du droit public de l’Europe chrétienne. 
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favour of the Greeks (1825), he suggests that the Greek nation, which was not 
politically integrated into the Ottoman Empire, is not based on any of the conditions 
which associate the subjects with the sovereigns and the sovereigns with the subjects. 
The Muslims alone are the legal subjects of the Sultan, while the Greeks are just slaves 
without rights, insofar as there is no legal slavery. That is precisely why they cannot be 
regarded as rebels (Chateaubriand, 1825: 10-11, 19).
21
 According to Chateaubriand, the 
claim of Europe that it is legally bound to the Sublime Porte through treaties and that it 
cannot undertake a war against the Porte is not valid; the whole of Europe could just 
demand that the Sultan should grant the Greeks’ just requests and should stop a war that 
exterminates Christians and damages commercial relations and interests. The 
recognition of the autonomy of Greece by Europe would force the Sultan to do the 
same. The liberation of Greece is a generalized desire fuelled by the association with 
ancient Greece and philhellenism (Chateaubriand, 1825: 22). 
Summing up the argumentation about the legitimacy of the Greek War of 
Independence, we can identify three groups: 
A. The ultras regard the Greek Revolution as an offshoot of the French 
Revolution and identify it with the revolutions in Europe and America, which are 
democratic and dangerous for the royal thrones. They compare the Ottoman Empire 
with the European monarchies, where the value of the legitimacy of the governments is 
paramount. As a result, they consider the Sultan to be the legitimate sovereign of the 
Greeks, and the right of conquest is acknowledged by the international treaties.  
B. The conservative Philhellenes supporting the Greek fight and the Greeks of the 
Tsar’s court distinguish the Revolution from other revolutions as a legitimate national 
War for Independence and the elimination of slavery; the latter cannot be legitimate 
because it never granted any rights to its subjects or, even if it did, it did not respect 
them. The Ottoman authority is condemned as illegitimate due to its practices, and it is 
not considered to be equal to the Christian courts of Europe. The Christian Greeks never 
integrated into the society of conquest, and retained their religious and linguistic 
identity, so they have every right to rise up in arms and to constitute an independent 
nation.  
C. The liberals, who are in their totality Philhellenes, identify the Greek 
Revolution with those in Europe and America, and emphasize as much its national and 
                                                 
21
 Appel en faveur de la cause sacrée des Grecs, par M. le Vicomte de Chateaubriand, membre de la 
Société en faveur des Grecs.  
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legitime character as its democratic content, while also appealing to the ancient Greek 
past.  
The pressure of the philhellenic trend and of the public opinion, supporting the 
“brave” and “tortured” descendents of the Hellenes, on the European governments but 
mainly the intra-European competition, the power politics of the Great Powers and the 
rupture in the allegedly solid front of the Holy Alliance gradually change the political 
scene in favour of the Greeks. England recognized the Greek nation as participating in a 
war in 1823 and granted a loan to the Greek government in the middle of 1824. The 
rapprochement between the English and the Russians in 1825 resulted in the Protocol of 
St Petersburg, in which the constitution of the Greek state is mentioned for the first 
time, in contrast with the principles of the Holy Alliance which in the meantime had 
suppressed all other European revolutions. The refusal of the Sublime Porte to give in to 
the pressure for peace and the agitation regarding a Russian military intervention led to 
the Treaty of London (1827) between England, Russia and France, where the three 
states express decisively their will with respect to a solution of the Greek issue by 
means of a military intervention by them in case the Porte did not accept the truce; this 
situation resulted in the naval battle of Navarino and the destruction of the Turkish fleet 
by the three Powers. The Russian-Ottoman war of 1828-1829 and the Treaty of 
Adrianople expedited the decisions of the Powers. Finally, with the Protocol of London 
(1830), signed by England, Russia and France, Greece was acknowledged to constitute 
an independent state with all the political, administrative and commercial rights 
associated with absolute independence. 
The foundation of the Greek state was indicative of a change in European politics 
and of the first phase in the creation of nation states during the 19
th
 century, as opposed 
to the legitimacy and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire which had been valid 
beforehand and had been endorsed by the Holy Alliance. The latter, however, despite 
the crucial role of England, will succeed in imposing the replacement of the Greek 
revolutionary democratic polity by a Bavarian absolute monarch appointed by the 
Alliance itself (Schröder, 1994: 443-465; Gouderc, 2015: 47-74). 
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